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Summary 
In this paper I will briefly discuss and explain my theory and logic 
behind the determinants of VC financing that I consider most relevant. It is 
important to understand how they relate to the provision of venture financing 
and it is directly related to the analysis of the policy attempts to model a 
venture capital industry in different environments, which is a focus of the next 
section of this text. 
Generally, the identified sets of determinants lie in three broad 
categories. These include: the existence of the avenue of exit for the venture 
capitalists - usually thought of as the presence of a large and liquid stock 
market; favorable legal, fiscal and regulatory framework supportive of the 
private business initiative; and the presence of a strong human capital base. 
Keywords: Venture capital, private equity, stock markets, liquidity, law and 
finance, bankruptcy, government policy, taxes, moral hazard, agency 
problem 
Determinants of the venture capital 
1.1. Introduction 
In the venture capital financing process there are three distinct parties 
involved, and they all contribute to the company because of their „selfish” 
reasons which motivates them, at the same time, to make a profit and behave 
rationally. The inventor/founder applies for the funds to the venture capitalist 
(VC). VC receives the funds from the outside investors and puts them into this 
new, promising company. He supports the company in stages of development 
(seed, start up, expansion, maturity, IPO) both financially and through the 
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management advice and industry connections until the firm reaches maturity. 
Upon maturity, the company's stock is sold at the initial public offering (IPO). 
Through IPO, the venture capitalist collects their own personal profit, 
distributes the share to the outside investors and hands back the company 
management to the founder. For the VC, it is important that company succeeds 
for two reasons, his personal reputation and possibility of obtaining funds from 
the outside investors in the future. For the founder it is also a question of 
personal profit form the equity sale but also the incentive of retaking the firm's 
management after the VC has exited the investment and for the outside 
investors their retribution in profit. So, on the micro level, all the stakeholders 
are motivated to play their role in a common goal of building up a company 
and their roles are highly interrelated and interdependent. 
From a macro perspective, this process is not independent from the 
outside environment in which the venture financing takes place. In order for 
investors to bet their money on a particular business plan, there need to be 
innovators who will bring about the intellectual property product for profit to 
the market in the first place, there need to exist specialized venture capitalists 
who will seek to raise the funds and turn them into financial gains. Inseparably, 
there needs to exists a mechanism that would make this process possible and its 
quality will depend on the variety of factors which might be of economic, legal, 
institutional, regulatory, fiscal, social or cultural nature. In other words, there 
are determinants that affect the venture capital demand and supply. 
Research focusing on the drivers behind venture capital phenomenon is 
still relatively scarce and in its early stage given the economic significance of 
VC and the impact it has had over the past couple of decades. More closely 
related to our discussion in this section, studies of Black and Gilson (1998), 
Gompers and Lerner (1998, 1999, 2001), Jeng and Wells (2000), Da Rin et all 
(2004) and Michelacci and Suarez (2000) investigate the influence of stock 
markets on venture capital. Other studies like those of La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1997,1998), Cumming and Fleming (2002), 
Armour (2002), Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2003) and Armour and 
Cumming (2004) analyze the role of the law and certain aspects of legal 
systems in venture capital financing and Milhaput (1997), Black and Gilson 
(1998), Baygan and Freudenberg (2000), Vermeulen (2001), Bottazzi and Da 
Rin (2002), Rigaut (2002), Scwienbacher (2002) and Hege, Palomino and 
Scwienbacher (2003) investigate the cross country variation and difference in 
venture capital industry practices in United States and Europe/other countries. 
There are also numbers of papers investigating the impact of taxation 
regulation, labor market rigidity, GDP, market capitalization growth, etc. 
 If we can identify the defining factors behind the well functioning VC 
industry, than we can have a clearer view of applying it elsewhere. From the 
practitioner’s point of view, various venture capital associations, such as the 
Goran Dostić Determinants of the Venture Capital 
 97
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), also publish the annual list of 
the factors considered to be the index benchmarks for the environment 
supportive of the venture capital industry. 
Difficult aspect of VC analysis that would lead to a proposition for a 
global model of venture capital is in the fact that most countries, developed and 
particularly developing, differ in their macroeconomic, structural, institutional, 
legal, regulatory, fiscal, cultural and social set up and experience. For instance, 
even if we can identify a legal or regulatory variable that significantly impacts 
the VC investments in one country or a region, it may not be an easily possible, 
practical or straightforward task of altering that same variable or applying it in 
another country as it might be related to, or complemented by, other, untested 
and perhaps unalterable social, regulatory or cultural factors. In addition, a firm 
specific data for a detailed analysis is usually hard or simply impossible to 
obtain. 
The paper focuses on the related financial theory in section one, section 
two examines two practical attempts at starting up a VC industry in two 
distinctly different (financially speaking) environments, Germany and Israel, 
and draws the conclusion form their experience. Last section concludes. 
1.2 Demand for Venture Capital 
Demand for venture capital financing comes from the entrepreneurs with 
innovative ideas. What could determine this level of demand for venture 
financing? First, there have to exist the incentives on the part of entrepreneurs 
to engage in the formation of a company in the first place. Founder of a start up 
is looking to make a financial profit and the private business has to be his best 
possible alternative to do so. He has to be adequately motivated to pursue his 
own business. Accordingly, the factors that would play a role in his decision to 
demand the VC financing are related to the regulation and the nature of the 
labor market, the capital gains tax rate and tax system in the country, 
bankruptcy regulation as well as the presence of a strong and liquid stock 
market. Finally, a general innovation potential of an economy would define a 
number of skilled entrepreneurs as the generators of ideas, or human capital 
endowment of a country demanding the venture capital financing. 
In the economies with rigid labor markets, the entrepreneur will be less 
inclined to start his own business than in an economy with flexible labor 
market. He will consider his eventual pay off from running his own company 
and compare it to his pay off and benefit structure as an employee. In the labor 
markets that are particularly rigid, where employment in a company is usually 
life-long and secure, where benefit package is sufficiently large and which 
offer high social status, scientist have little incentives to give up their lucrative 
positions as employees and start a risky business. Furthermore, failure to 
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succeed in the start up could mean permanent loss of a chance to regain the 
employment in a company they came from. Flexible labor markets offer less 
job security, but an easier way to enter and re-enter the labor market should the 
private business fail where as success in the running of own business usually 
offers a higher pay off and social status than in the rigid markets. Therefore we 
would expect more private business activity and VC demand in flexible labor 
markets than in rigid labor markets. 
Tax system affects the portion of the revenues that entrepreneurs get to 
keep for themselves. Higher the capital gain tax rate, one simply gets to keep 
less money for them, and logically is less motivated to run their own business. 
Therefore moderate taxes should provide for the increased incentives to seek 
the equity finance and higher tax rate, especially if they are progressive since 
returns on VC investments are supposed to be particularly high, would reduce 
the demand for VC. 
Bankruptcy regulation is related to the opportunity cost of running a 
private business, especially in the decision phase of forming a company. Before 
there is any VC financial backing available, entrepreneur has to devote a 
substantial amount of time to the formation of the company which often means 
giving up their employment and living on savings, they may have to borrow 
relatively large sum of money to start with the company and if they have to 
face a burdensome bankruptcy rules, with long time to discharge, they will not 
be motivated to form a company or they may not be given a second chance to 
do so should they fail the first time. On the other hand, if bankruptcy rules do 
not penalize the failure so severely and if time to discharge is relatively short, 
than entrepreneur will find the decision to take the risk less troublesome and is 
more likely to start a company and eventually apply for the VC financing. 
Related to the necessity of exit options discussed in the previous section, 
demand for venture capital is connected to the availability of a liquid stock 
market as an avenue of financing the VC projects. Since venture capitalists 
exits the investment at the point of IPO, it is expected that entrepreneurs will 
also prefer this form of financing as it offers them a way of regaining control 
(or at least part of it) over the company. In addition, the more developed 
financial markets are, less likely it is that there would be in-house R&D 
conducted on the part of large companies, and more likely it is that the 
inventors would be seeking a private profit through the demand for VC. 
Finally, VC finances inventions and high – tech businesses and stronger 
the human capital of a country, more likely it is that there would be more 
skilled entrepreneurs with intellectual property patents demanding the venture 
capital backing in an economy. 
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1.3 Supply of Venture Capital 
Venture capital is supplied by the actively involved venture capitalists 
who invest portion of their own funds into the selected projects and who 
connect the outside investors with these projects. Therefore what would have 
an effect on the level of supply of VC in an economy are the incentives for the 
active VCs and incentives and quantity of the outside investors to engage in 
financing the VC backed projects, as well as the relationship between the 
outside investors and VCs. 
We know that venture capitalists add value and realize profits by 
intervening in the start ups, selecting and screening the applicants and 
controlling the management decisions. Therefore, the incentives for VCs to 
finance the start ups will exist only if there are no prohibitive regulations 
preventing the venture capitalists from adding the value and having the 
contractual tools to add the value to a portfolio company (management controls 
in terms of - board participation, veto decisions, power to replace the 
management and deny funding, preferred stock options, etc.).  
Taxing regulations as well as labor rigidities also affect the decision of 
skilled managers, best of whom are former entrepreneurs, to engage in venture 
financing of new companies, as well as the incentives of outside investors put 
their money in venture capital backed projects. Higher the tax rate, larger the 
proportion of the revenues that has to be given to the government and smaller 
the incentives for the supply of VC financing. This is the case for both, the 
active venture capitalists and the outside investors who provide the larger 
portion of the funds. 
More rigid the labor market, higher the opportunity cost of running a VC 
firm instead of being an employee for a large corporation and less likely that 
there will be many former entrepreneurs, with an experience of building up 
their own company and taking it public that will be engaging in the business as 
a venture capitalist. 
Level of human capital endowment is also crucial for the venture capital 
supply in an economy since the quality screening, monitoring, financing and 
nourishing a portfolio company can be done only by the skilled managers. 
Existence of liquid stock markets is just as important for VC supply as it 
is for the VC demand. Lack of exit options would hurt the provision of active 
venture capitalists but also of outside investors to provide the financing, since 
the best way for them to collect their share of profits is through a developed 
IPO market. Stock markets and the successful exists are also a way for VCs to 
demonstrate their abilities of making a profitable company to the outside 
investors, and a way to build their reputation for the future funding of high-tech 
companies. 
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To recap, the level of VC financing is likely to be higher if the 
regulations that govern the relationship between the outside investors, active 
VCs and entrepreneurs are such so that they have good, profit making, 
incentives to engage in the business, and are best enabled to overcome the 
agency problems characteristic to a financing of an idea based business with 
large asymmetric information issues. 
It is important to note that simply identifying the drivers of VC 
financing, especially as they relate to a sophisticated market such as the US, 
can hardly amount to sufficient guidelines for a policymaker in a different 
country. The challenge, as mentioned earlier, remains to apply the defying 
aspects of this system elsewhere. Given the fact that VC industry in the US was 
not engineered but has evolved over time and in a given, unique environment, 
we can only use these determinants as pillars upon which to construct a model 
for other nations. In the next section we will discuss the previous attempts by 
the governments to create a VC industry and see how we can use this analysis 
for the policy recommendation. 
2. Modeling the VC in Emerging Markets 
As stated above, creation of a sustainable VC industry should encompass 
the provision of several key factors that could roughly be grouped into: legal 
and regulatory framework welcoming of the entrepreneurial effort and such 
that contractually enables all parties to overcome the agency problems; 
provision of access to the liquid stock market and the presence of a critical 
level of strong human capital base - both as it relates to the innovative capacity 
of the entrepreneurs and the provision of the sufficient number of skilled 
intermediaries as the actively involved, specialized venture capitalists. 
One thing we can claim with certainty is that the VC industry has 
originated in the United States and that this market remains the most 
sophisticated and advanced VC market in the world. American financial system 
is defined as a stock market based system and naturally, one would expect the 
provision of VC to be a relatively easier task in a more similar system than in 
one where, for instance, banks play a more dominant role and where a civil 
legal code provides for a lesser protection of the shareholders One would also 
expect that a well developed country with a very educated labor market would 
be adept to engineering a VC industry from the start with a relative ease, or at 
least that it would understand the basic incentive relationship between the 
shareholders and accordingly apply those principles in an effort to incubate the 
VC industry. But even though the availability of these factors (stock markets or 
good economic infrastructure) is important to the VC industry, it is no way 
sufficient. Systems differ in terms of their economic structure and legal 
heritage, but also in the level of the entrepreneurial culture and social 
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incentives to become an entrepreneur. If we are starting a VC industry from the 
scratch the questions arise as to what role is there for the government and 
where should it start from? Should it provide the funding and hope to bolster a 
demand for VC, or does it need to make some legal or regulatory adjustments, 
or should it be a combination of two? In the process of seeding a new VC 
industry, what should be the condition for funding and who should be entrusted 
with the screening process and monitoring? 
We will see that success will depend on the ability of the policymakers 
to understand the core principles of venture financing as discussed in the 
section two and three. Failure to understand these principles, which are based 
on strong incentives, can be a cause of a poor and wasteful policy design. 
Practice has shown that provision of VC is very sensitive to the existence of 
private profit making motives of all stakeholders in the process and VC fund 
design that can overcome the problems of agency and asymmetric information. 
Existing institutions are not always adept, or sufficiently motivated to harness 
the emerging VC industry. If the policymakers fail to incorporate the tools 
reflecting this relationship, they may not just waste their time and funds but 
impede the creation of the venture capital industry. 
 After analyzing the past policy efforts in this direction, we can arrive to 
a new, clearer role of the government in the VC creation process, precisely: 
given the existing economic and institutional realities, what can the 
government best do to create the environment in which all parties in the VC 
investment process feel maximally motivated to align their interests? In other 
words, do the structural set up and contractual aspects solve the agency 
problem inherent in the VC type of investments? Can we make a relationship 
system where the manager of the fund will have absolute incentive to pursue a 
shareholder wealth maximizing goals? Further, how do we best arrange so that 
VC can freely exercise their value adding role which consists of taking full 
managerial control and monitoring? Would the condition for funding 
sufficiently screen for the serious entrepreneurs and will the shareholders be 
driven by profit but stay out of the investment decisions and would the 
entrepreneurs deliver the maximum effort to develop the product and help the 
company mature? The comparison of the experience of Germany’s WFG fund 
and Israel’s Yozma fund is a case in point. 
2.1 Germany 
Organized as conscious effort on the part of the German government to 
jump start the VC industry, the WFG was doomed to fail (internal rate of return 
negative 25.07) due to the inappropriate contractual and governance structure 
under which it was set up. It lacked tools that would sufficiently mitigate the 
agency problems between the shareholders and entrepreneurs and motivate 
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them to align their interests. Main shareholders of the fund were government 
and biggest German banks, the only dominating financial institutions in 
Germany. Motivation for the government to create the fund was the apparent 
technology-market gap in the German economy, it wanted to commercialize 
the industry technology and it could rely only on the banks for funding. But the 
primary concern for the banks was maintaining the reputation and minimizing 
the risk. Hence, the very first obstacle for WFG was conflict of interest among 
main shareholders. The WFG governance structure thus, instead of emulating 
the relationship of interdependence and alignment of the goals, did not solve 
the agency problem between them. In addition, the board representation was 
split between the government and bank officials with a different agenda, and 
WFG failed to provide the appropriate motivation and screening device for a 
good selection of entrepreneurs. Its criteria for selection of applicants, among 
other, contained a provision that „WFG will only finance companies that could 
not have obtained financing elsewhere.” This exacerbated the adverse selection 
and free riding problem. These institutional problems were transferred to the 
relationship between the WFG and the entrepreneurs in the structural set up of 
the fund. Mainly, since WFG took the minority equity position with no power 
to replace the founders and provide managerial assistance, the core function of 
the VC investment financing, the value adding role, was missing from the 
equation. Portfolio companies did not receive strategic business advice and 
professional assistance in product development as it would be the case under 
usual VC project investment. Instead, they were only offered assistance with 
accounting. But given the premise under which fund was designed - the 
essential aspect of management guidance was not even desired. WFG also 
offered self imposed caps on the upside of the deal, stipulating that it might exit 
the deal as soon as the portfolio company became profitable. So the WFG 
problem extended not only to the relationship between the outside investors 
and the VCs or question of where monitoring role would come from and if the 
management would be skilled enough with the business aspect of developing 
and marketing a high-tech product. It was actually designed so that the 
environment in which the management would have disposable tools for 
exercising the founder replacement and guidance control did not even exist. 
This meant that value-adding role was missing from the WFG formula and that 
the agency problems on all levels were unresolved. 
In conclusion, the poor performance of WFG was inherent in the weak 
institutional and contractual governance structure of its set up. It was 
essentially the failure on the part of the policymakers to understand the 
business model under which the venture capital is supposed to work and reflect 
it in the contracts governing the relations between the stakeholders. 
Consequently, the premises under which the WFG was designed as well as the 
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conditions for provision of funding resulted in no incentives, no monitoring 
and bad project selection. 
Overall, for this to come about, Germany also must have had the 
underdeveloped entrepreneurial culture – reflected in lack of knowledgeable 
government officials and lack of appreciation for the VC support on the part of 
inventors. In addition, status of businessman was not looked at admirably. We 
know from the above discussion, that rigidity of the labor market, as it was 
than in Germany, guaranteeing a lifetime employment in a major company, did 
not offer proper social incentives for the innovators to engage in 
entrepreneurship. Result was that most start ups were managed by 
inexperienced founders with no business training or understanding the way VC 
works. They neither received nor wished to receive management support. 
 It has also been shown that, only with the subsequent shift in the labor 
market reflected in the arrival of new generations of entrepreneurs, more 
appreciative of, and familiar with the Anglo-American style of business 
venturing, German VC industry was able to make a turn for the better and start 
to make some progress. Understanding that this kind of business model needed 
both, improved access to the stock market and provision of incentives driven 
by the profit making agents, only than, Germany was able to attract more 
talented people to entrepreneurship and create more suitable ground for the VC 
development. 
2.2 Israel 
Contrary to the German original effort to start the VC industry, Israel’s 
experience shows that a better understanding of the incentives structure leads to 
a better result. Israeli government established Yozma Ltd. In 1993 through 
which it created nine venture capital funds in which it was a partner. Instead of 
giving a call option to the entrepreneurs, such was the case of German WFG; 
Yozma considered the basis of the incentives structure and monitoring and 
gave it to the fund. 
 It matched up to forty percent of other investor’s capital who had a call 
option on Yozma’s investment at cost plus nominal interest and seven percent 
of future profits. Whereas WFG’s subsidy to the entrepreneurs and the banks 
created no incentives to monitor, Yozma’s subsidy to other investors 
strengthened the incentive to monitor by accepting a large share of downside 
risk. Contractual arrangement stipulated that Yozma would not make the 
investment decisions, but those who held the private stake in the investments. 
In 1997, funds were successfully privatized. 
 In addition, government looked to encourage the investment into VC 
through favorable taxing legislation regarding the personal investments. Low 
capital gains tax rate including a temporary legislation allowing tax-free 
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investing in Israeli venture capital funds by foreign VC funds which had tax-
free status in their domestic markets. This had an effect of stimulating the 
investments in private equity which in turn spurred development of active, 
vibrant and liquid equity markets which was critical for the rapid development 
of the Israeli VC industry. 
3. Conclusion - Lessons for Policymakers 
As we have seen, in order for any viable VC model to function, all the 
stakeholders need to have strong incentives, the contractual framework and 
governance structure has to reflect this in order to fully mitigate the agency 
problems to which the VC type of investing is very sensitive. If these issues are 
overlooked, any provision of government founding is bound to be a waste of 
money or even an impediment to creation of VC industry as the moral hazard 
problem is not solved but exacerbated and poor project selection and free 
riding can crowd out possible private investments, if there are any. 
Policymakers in Israel have understood the rationale behind the venture 
capital investments better than their counterparts in Germany. Yozma was 
better designed than the WFG, which lacked contractual and structural 
elements to solve the agency problems. Perhaps this is not a surprise since 
Israel had a stronger entrepreneurial culture than Germany, it was a society 
more open to the business ownership and venturing and policymakers there 
were able to design a VC model that would emulate the American model as 
best as possible. In spite of Germany being one of the most advanced 
economies in the world, they found it more difficult to start with a business 
model uncharacteristic to the German experience. They had a tradition of bank-
based financial system, company ownership held by families and supported by 
those risk-averse banks. Business success, normally accepted in Anglo-
American society, was uncommon, R&D was done in house and inventors 
retained as employees in the large companies. 
If we take the American institutional set up and business environment to 
be the original ground for the VC, than any environment deviating from that 
model would imply more difficulty for the implementation of the VC industry. 
Characteristics of the American investment environment have features much in 
line with the drivers behind the VC demand and supply discussed in the 
previous section. Besides the stock markets based financial system and a very 
strong entrepreneurial culture and mentality, they also consist in:  
• Contracting practices and governance structure that count on value adding 
role of independent VCs, provide for the monitoring process by the 
actively involved and profit driven fund managers who hold the tools to 
enforce their managerial control and entrepreneurs who understand and 
appreciate the role of VC;  
Goran Dostić Determinants of the Venture Capital 
 105
• Strong participation of outside investors (especially large institutional 
investors such as pension funds motivated through the favorable tax 
regulation), but as shareholders who have no say in investment decisions of 
VCs; In addition, they have a  
o Liberal (flexible) labor market;  
o Non prohibitive, stimulating taxing regulation for outside investors, 
VCs and founders and;  
o Favorable bankruptcy laws. 
 
And larger the deviation, more difficult the creation of the VC would be. 
If the US, followed by other similar economic and legal systems such as UK 
for instance, are on the one extreme of the scale and the state owned, non 
liberal regimes with non transparent regulatory system and no stock markets on 
the other extreme of the scale - than we can think of an economy 
characteristics continuum within which a country, with all its complementary 
characteristics of: economic level of development and infrastructure, regulatory 
and legal framework, fiscal conditions and rigidity of the labor market, and 
entrepreneurial culture, can be placed.  
Governments that seek to implement a VC industry can be best advised 
to make the legal adjustments and reforms that would bring them closer to the 
environment that promotes and protects the incentives of all the stakeholders. 
A fund created to seed the VC will not be successful if it is not designed to 
structurally mitigate the moral hazard problem between the shareholders, 
managers and inventors inherent in this type of investments. But beside this, 
there need to exist the incentives for the outside investors, venture capitalists 
and entrepreneurs to emerge as interested parties in the first place. 
Development of domestic stock markets is important and eventually 
necessary for any serious VC industry to be sustained. But they cannot be 
simply designed overnight and made to work profitably regardless of the 
general legal and regulatory environment. Before markets can become vibrant 
and liquid, there has to exist a favorable legal environment and contractual 
design governing the relationship between the stakeholders that incentivizes all 
parties to get involved in the process in the first place. If, on the other hand, the 
legal, regulatory or tax environment is prohibitive of the VC investing, neither 
the demand for nor supply of venture capital will reach a critical stage for the 
creation of and sustained activity of liquid stock markets. 
 It is also possible to make use of listing on the regional or foreign stock 
markets as well. Countries with less developed domestic stock markets, but 
good business connections abroad, have shown that this is possible. Israeli 
companies have mostly listed on the NASDAQ and experience of Singapore 
also shows that they have managed to achieve significant growth without 
having a very strong domestic IPO market.  
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Creation of favorable investment environment implicitly helps the 
growth of stock market and IPO activity. If investments become more frequent 
and profitable, access to funds will be easier. This, over time, breeds the 
generation of entrepreneurs and managers with experience, their success 
becomes something that upcoming investors would like to emulate and their 
profit is something that new managers would like to achieve for themselves 
and where outside investors would like to put their money in. In other words, 
when the economy learns to appreciate the VC business model, capital market 
activity becomes a normal thing - even failure is seen as a learning process, and 
this in turn lays the ground for establishment of the more liquid and vibrant 
stock markets. 
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